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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term 1963

No. 450

J. K. Abernathy, et al, Appellants

vs.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., et al

No. 451

Charlotte Council
Air Line Pilots Assn., Appellants

vs.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., et al

APPELLEE HEREIN
Employment Security Commission
of North Carolina

Appeal From the Supreme Court of North Carolina

MOTION TO DISMISS
AND
APPENDIX

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MOTION TO DISMISS

Both of these cases involve substantially the same questions and both are based upon a single record.

The appellee in the above-entitled cases moves to dismiss both appeals because the questions attempted to be raised by the appellants have been decided and set at rest by this Court and any Federal questions attempted to be raised by the appellants are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Special Appeals Deputy of the Employment Security Commission, No. 541-L; the decision of the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, No. 3301; the Judgment of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina; the Opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and the Judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, are set forth in the Appendix attached hereto.

The Opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is reported in 259 N. C. 190 and 130 S. E. 2d 292. The case was appealed to that Court from the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, which rendered a Judgment without written opinion.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

The appellants in their Jurisdictional Statements have adequately set forth the jurisdictional requisites.

NORTH CAROLINA STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials or services necessary to the con-

tinued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed. Provided, that an individual disqualified under the provisions of this subdivision shall continue to be disqualified thereunder after the labor dispute has ceased to be in active progress for such period of time as is reasonably necessary and required to physically resume operations in the method of operating in use at the plant, factory, or establishment of the employing unit."

Prior to the amendment adopted by the 1961 Legislature, Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina provided in part as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work that exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission

"a. He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and

"b. He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute:*** "

STATEMENT OF CASE

The appellee does not at all agree with the statement of the case as stated by either group of appellants in this case.

The facts are substantially that Eastern Air Lines, Incor-

porated, referred to as the employer, is engaged in the business of commercial air transportation transporting passengers, mail and cargo in interstate commerce. (Rp 13) The employer serves twenty-six states in the eastern half of the United States and one hundred and twenty cities, as well as Mexico City, Puerto Rico, Bermuda and Canada. (Rpp 11, 14)

The employer normally employs about seventeen thousand nine hundred employees throughout its system. (Rpp 11, 12) Approximately seven hundred of the employees are based in North Carolina, working in and out of the airports and cities served in North Carolina; namely, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-High Point. (Rp 8)

The employer employs various classifications of employees, among which are mechanics, pilots, stewards, stewardesses, flight engineers, communication workers, dispatchers and clerical workers. (Rpp 16,17,18,19) Some of the classifications mentioned are nonunion personnel. (Rpp 12,15)

A great many of the employees are represented by unions according to their skills and vocations. (Rp 15) These unions are (1) International Association of Machinists; (2) Airline Pilots Association; (3) Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association; (4) Flight Engineers International Association; (5) Communication Workers of America Union, and (6) Airline Dispatchers Association. The employer also has some nonunion personnel. (Rp 12) Within these union categories the union represents all employees without regard to whether they belong to a union or not. (Rp 15) Certain other employees such as ticket agents and sales people are not represented by unions. (Rp 15) The unions or associations bargain with the company on a system-wide basis. (Rpp 11,12)

In its system the employer employed five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers whose services were utilized on four-engine aircraft throughout its system. (Rp 13) Some of the four-engine aircraft land and take off with passengers and cargo at all airports in the system located in North Caro-

lina; namely, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-High Point, taking on passengers and cargo at each airport. (Rp 14) Jet planes belonging to the employer land and take off from the airport in Charlotte, taking on passengers and cargo as the necessity arises. (Rp 14) Flight engineers are employed and used on all four-engine craft, including jets, which land and take off in North Carolina. (Rp 14) None of the flight engineers are based in North Carolina, even though they fly in and out of the various airports in this state. (Rpp 15,25) The flight engineers perform services at each of the company's facilities in North Carolina and elsewhere throughout its entire system. (Rpp 15,21) When the four-engine craft land at the North Carolina airports the flight engineers inspect the planes for safety, airworthiness, and determine the distribution of gasoline. (Rp 21)

Approximately thirty-five percent of the loadings and planes used by the employer in its system are two-engine craft, and it follows that sixty-five percent of the loadings and planes used by the employer are four-engine craft, on all of which the services of flight engineers are utilized. (Rp 20)

On or about June 23, 1962, all of the five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers went out on strike and refused to carry out their work assignments. (Rpp 13,14,15,25) The strike and refusal to work was in protest of the failure of the employer and the bargaining agent representing the flight engineers to reach an agreement as to the qualifications of the flight engineers, there being a difference of opinion between such parties as to whether the flight engineers should be qualified as pilots. (Rpp 13,14,22,23,27) There was a difference of opinion as to the requirements of the third man in the cockpit of the jets. (Rpp 13,15,20,22) Beginning on June 23, 1962, and continuing through the date of the Special Appeals Deputy's hearing on July 12, 1962, the flight engineers failed and refused to perform their services in bringing the planes in and out of the facilities in North Carolina and elsewhere throughout the entire system of the company. (Rpp 13,15,25)

In consequence of the strike of the flight engineers, the employer cancelled all flights and furloughed several thousand employees, including its employees in North Carolina. (Rpp 13,14,15,21,23,24) Such employees were unemployed beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy, and their unemployment was due to th dispute or controversy in existence between the flight engineers and the employer. (Rp 13)

The only individuals who are involved in this proceeding are the employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, who were unemployed because of the labor dispute in active progress between Eastern and its flight engineers. Individuals who were employed at other establishments such as restaurants at the respective airports in North Carolina are not involved in this proceeding, as they were not the employees of Eastern Air Lines, and had no connection with such company. They were employed by other employers who leased their premises at the respective airports from the airport authorities, and any unemployment which existed at those establishments was because of lack of work. There was no labor dispute is existence at any of these premises or establishments and the businesses of such employers were carried on for the benefit of the public generally, and not for Eastern Air Lines, or any of its employees.

ARGUMENT

THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ATTEMPTED TO BE RAISED BY THE APPELLANTS IN THE STATE COURT ARE NOT SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTIONS.

The appellee takes the position that in view of the previous decisions of this Court on the subject complained of by the appellants, the questions raised have been decided and passed upon by this Court and no substantial Federal questions exist. This Court has in several instances passed upon the validity of the disqualification clauses contained in several of the unemployment compensation statutes, and particularly

the labor dispute disqualification statutes, and this Court has held that such statutes were not subject to any constitutional infirmity and found that there were valid considerations which supplied ample justification of each of the classifications attacked. See W. H. H. CHAMBERLIN, INC. v. ELMER F. ANDREWS, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL, 299 U. S. 515, and 301 U. S. 714. Also see CARMICHAEL v. SOUTHERN COAL & COKE CO., 301 U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 109 A. L. R. 1327. SAME v. GULF STATES PAPER CORPORATION, 301 U. S. 495. CHARLES C. STEWARD MACHINE CO. v. DAVIS, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883. IN RE WILLIAM AKERS, JR. CO., 121 F. 2d 846. DUNMORE CO. v. SMADER, 13 N. W. 2d 915. ELDRED v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 295 N. W. 412.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For the Court's information, it is necessary to discuss the labor dispute disqualification provision, section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, as amended, to give some historical background of that provision.

Under the law prior to the 1961 amendment, an individual was disqualified from receiving benefits for any week with respect to which his unemployment was DUE TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK which existed because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last employed. The law in existence prior to the amendment, however, contained an escape clause and the disqualification could be removed if it could be shown that he was not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and further, if it could be shown that he did not belong to a grade or class of workers of which there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurred, any of whom were participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. The Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina

passed upon such section of the law in several different cases.

IN RE STEVENSON, 237 N. C. 528, 75 S. E. 2d 520
IN RE STEELMAN, 219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. 2d 544, 135 ALR 929
U. C. C. v. LUNSFORD, 229 N. C. 570, 50 S. E. 2d 497
E. S. C. v. JARRELL, 231 N. C. 381, 57 S. E. 2d 403
U. C. C. v. MARTIN, 228 N. C. 277, 45 S. E. 2d 385

Under the former labor dispute provision as soon as there was a reasonable and substantial resumption of operations, or as soon as the stoppage of work terminated, the individuals who were unemployed as a result of that labor dispute, even though they might have been striking employees, could draw benefits under the law, if they were otherwise eligible. This was true even though the labor dispute had not been settled. This resulted in the Employment Security Commission paying out very large sums of money to strikers after the stoppage of work ceased to exist and charging such sums to the employers involved.

In the case of IN RE STEELMAN, Supra, Chief Justice Stacy stated very emphatically that one of the basic purposes of the labor dispute disqualification provision was to insure the complete and absolute neutrality of the Employment Security Commission in the administration of the law.

By and large the Unemployment Compensation Laws in the several states were patterned after the British Law which was first adopted in England in 1911. At the outset the administrators of the British Law maintained an official position of neutrality with respect to unemployment which occurred as a result of a labor dispute. Under the original British Law the cause of the dispute and the merits of the dispute were immaterial. If unemployment was the result of a labor dispute it was not compensable.

There is an article in the Nebraska Law Review by Virgil J. Haggart, Jr., June 1958, Volume 37, No. 4, the title of

which is "Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes." This is a very comprehensive article, and in a discussion of the initial British Law, the writer stated that there had been suggested two reasons for the policy of denying benefits to all individuals unemployed because of a labor dispute. Such reasons are as follows:

> "(1) It was not considered wise to permit the fund to be used to finance or subsidize workers engaged in trade disputes, because it was feared that if benefits were available to all workers unemployed as a result of a trade dispute, they would be encouraged to suspend work in furtherance of their position in the dispute, thereby imposing an unfair burden upon the employer, and working injury upon the national economy and upon the public at large; (2) because there had been no previous experience, it was feared that payment of benefits when unemployment was due to a labor dispute might cause a severe drain upon the funds available, thereby defeating the primary purpose for which the fund was created — the payment of benefits when unemployment was due to 'influctuations in trade.'"

Under the law prior to the amendment in 1961, the Commission was required to pay both strikers and non-strikers once it could be shown that the "stoppage of work" no longer existed, even though the labor dispute continued to exist. The result was that the Commission, under the law, was in effect financing labor disputes after the "stoppage of work" terminated. This certainly did not insure the absolute and complete neutrality of the Commission as contemplated by Justice Stacy in the case of IN RE STEELMAN, Supra.

The 1961 Legislature in its wisdom saw fit to amend the law so that neither strikers nor non-strikers would draw any benefits so long as there was a labor dispute in active progress, even though the stoppage of work might have terminated. The Legislature passed such amendment in order to insure absolute neutrality and so that the Commission would not be put in the position of paying benefits where a labor

dispute existed and thereby financing the labor dispute. This was well within the police power of the Legislature. The Legislature was clearly in its rights in providing that any individual whose unemployment was due to a labor dispute in active progress would be denied benefits.

Under the law prior to the amendment in 1961 it was possible for there to be collusion between different groups where the members of one group in a plant, comprising a small segment of workers in the plant, could go out on strike thereby causing the unemployment of hundreds and even thousands of other workers who actually were not participating in the strike and who did not belong to the same grade or class of workers, all of whom could draw benefits. The 1961 amendment was designed by the Legislature, among other things, to prevent such collusion. Under the circumstances as related above the unemployment trust fund would thereby, in effect, subsidize a strike.

There is no question but that there was a labor dispute in active progress at the establishment at which the appellants were last employed. All flight engineers employed by the company refused their work assignments and refused to perform their duties and it became necessary for the company to close down substantially all of its operations throughout its system, including their operations in North Carolina, which was a direct result of the labor dispute, and no amount of semantics can change the fact that it was the strike which caused the company to close down its operations. If there had been no strike, none of the North Carolina employees would have been thrown out of work. The company was so crippled by its inability to operate the four-engine craft that it found it economically necessary to substantially cease all operations. The operations of the company are so integrated and one phase is so interdependent upon another phase, that the Commission and the Supreme Court necessarily reached the conclusion that the "establishment" as referred to in the law embraced the entire system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated.

It is true that none of the flight engineers were stationed in North Carolina, but they performed services on all four-engine planes landing and taking off in North Carolina. The record shows that when the four-engine craft land at the North Carolina airports, the flight engineers inspect the planes for safety and airworthiness, and determine the distribution of gasoline; (Rp 21) therefore, these flight engineers did perform services at the North Carolina airports, and consequently, there was a strike at the airports in North Carolina because they refused to perform their usual services in North Carolina.

The appellants contend they were not interested in the dispute between the company and the flight engineers; that they were innocent by-standers, and that they should not be disqualified. The New York Law (Sec. 592) provides that when an employee loses his employment because of a strike, lockout, or other industrial controversy in the establishment at which he was employed, his benefit rights are suspended for a period of seven consecutive weeks in addition to a waiting period. It is immaterial under the New York Law, as well as the North Carolina Law, whether or not the employee is interested in or finances or participates in the strike against his employer. If he is unemployed because of the strike, his benefits are suspended for seven weeks. In this connection we call the Court's attention to the case of IN RE GILMARTIN Claim, 217 N. Y. Supp. 2d 22, May 25, 1961. Also reported in 10 N. Y. Reports, 2nd Series May 25, 1961. The New York labor dispute disqualification section has been held constitutional by this Court. See CHAMBERLIN v. ANDREWS, 301 U. S. 515 and 301 U. S. 714.

The payment of unemployment insurance benefits is strictly a matter of state law. Thirty-three states and Puerto Rico withhold benefits from employees on strike or laid off because of a stoppage of work resulting from a labor dispute for so long as the stoppage of work lasts. In seventeen states and the District of Columbia no reference is made to disqualification because of a stoppage of work. In these jurisdictions

employees are denied benefits if there is either a "labor dispute" or as some statutes phrase it, a "labor dispute in active progress." North Carolina comes within this last group.

Upon the evidence in this case the Commission made certain findings of fact and under those findings it was concluded that the individuals involved in this proceeding were disqualified for benefits for the weeks of their unemployment as their unemployment was caused by the labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment or other premises at which they were last employed. Consequently, the Commission denied benefits to all claimant-employees in this proceeding so long as their unemployment was caused by a labor dispute in active progress.

ALL EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED WERE DENIED BENEFITS

Both groups of appellants have, in effect, stated to this Court that they have been discriminated against because they have been denied benefits; whereas, certain restaurant employees who were employed by independnt restaurant operators at the various airports in North Carolina were paid benefits.

In the first place, there was no evidence whatever as to any unemployment of restaurant employees employed by independent operators being idled by a labor dispute. There was only a statement by the Special Appeals Deputy to the effect that any employees who had been employed by operators of restaurants located at the respective airports who became unemployed would be eligible to receive benefits, if otherwise eligible. (Rp 11) No evidence whatever was taken in respect to the status of such individuals. The appellants argue that these people are in the same category as the appellants in this cause; however, such is not the case. The restaurant operators were operating independent business establishments in no way related or connected with the operations of Eastern Air Lines. They were operating restaurants

leased from the airport authorities and open to the general public and did not cater specifically to the employees of Eastern Air Lines. These restaurant workers were employed at the premises or at the establishments of the respective restaurant operators, and not at the premises or at the establishment of Eastern Air Lines. There were several other air lines operating out of all of the airports in North Carolina. There were also extensive private operations carried on at such airports. Consequently, if such individuals were otherwise eligible under the law, they were entitled to benefits as their unemployment was because of lack of work, and certainly no labor dispute existed at these premises. There is nothing in the record to show that the cause of the unemployment of these individuals was attributable to a labor dispute. There was no labor dispute in existence between the restaurant employees and the operators of the restaurants. The payment of benefits to such individuals could not in any way impair the neutrality of the Commission in any labor dispute, and the receipt of benefits by such workers did not in any manner contribute to the financing of any labor dispute.

It is submitted that there was no discrimination by the Commission against the appellants in any benefits that may have been awarded to the restaurant workers and that the rights of the appellants as guaranteed to them by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States were not violated. Further argument will be set forth in respect to the contentions of the appellants that the provisions of Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina are repugnant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE APPELLANTS, CHARLOTTE COUNCIL, AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

Both groups of appellants in the questions raised in their jurisdictional statements have alleged that Section 96-14 (4)

of the General Statutes of North Carolina is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. As stated above, the appellee will answer in its further argument the contention of both groups of appellants in respect to the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Appellants, Charlotte Council, Airline Pilots Association, directed its first question to the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the Charlotte Council, Airline Pilots Association, has presented several other questions which will be answered in the order in which they were raised.

In question No. 2 such appellants contend that the enactment of Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina amounted to an usurpation of the police power of the state in that such statute was more extensive and discriminatory than was required.

In one of the leading cases in North Carolina on the subject of police powers, which is the case of STATE v. WHITAKER, 228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. 2d 860, such case being affirmed by this Court in 335 U. S. 525, Justice Seawell of the North Carolina Supreme Court stated as follows:

"* * * The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved for the states respectively or to the people.' Within this reservation of powers to the individual states, is what has been judicially termed 'the police power.' * * * The authority of the Legislature to pass this statute, or any other measure it may deem necessary in the public welfare, is unlimited except where prohibited by the Federal or State Constitutions or in conflict with Federal law enacted pursuant to constitutionally granted authority. * * *

"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor Article I, Section 17 contains any unqualified prohibition. Both operate to

prevent the Legislature from depriving anyone of individual or property rights except by due process of law. Due process is, of necessity, an elastic term which through the years has been expanded to cope with the varying problems of our increasing complex society. * * *

"* * * The dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment, that 'the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained,' must be viewed in the light of contemporary conditions under which the Legislature has seen fit to enact the statute in question."

* * *

"Any legislation in exercise of the police power must perforce affect in different degrees persons or groups within its orbit who occupy different economic, social or political positions with reference to the ends sought by the legislation. * * *"

The North Carolina Legislature in passing the 1961 amendment viewed the legislation in the light of contemporary conditions and the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the conditions which brought about the amendment. The Supreme Court of North Carolina considered the social and industrial reasons behind the adoption of the amendment.

The Supreme Court of Colorado in the case of COTTRELL CLOTHING COMPANY v. TEETS, 342 P. 2d 1016, rendered an exhaustive opinion on police powers. The Court had the following to say:

"The line of demarcation between a proper exercise of the police power and an infringement of constitutional guarantees is not always well defined. We deem it advisable to direct attention to some fundamentals in this connection, and to that end, we quote from the opinion in In Re Interrogatories of Governor on Chapter 118, Session Laws of 1935, 97 Colo. 587, 52 P. 2d 663, 667, as follows:

'Police power, the genesis of the General Assembly's action, is inherent in government, and was well known to the common law. 4 Black Com. 162. 'The power * * * has been said to be as broad as the public welfare. It is an inherent attribute of sovereignty with which the state is endowed for the protection and general welfare of its citizens. ROWEKAMP v. MERCANTILE COMMERCE B & T CO., 8 Cir., 72 F. 2d 852, 858.' * * * The statute claiming our attention is the expression of that branch of the government having primary authority to determine what is requisite to promote health, safety, and morals. SMITH v. PEOPLE, 54 Colo. 270, 117 P. 612, 36 L. R. A., N. S. 158; 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 1231. Unless by its terms it imports evil, or is calculated to operate arbitrarily, oppressively or unreasonably, courts may not void the act. MCLEAN v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, 211 U. S. 539, 29 S. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315. That in its operation a police measure may increase their labor, decrease the value of their property, or otherwise inconvenience individuals, does not make the act to offend. 2 Coley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) pp. 1228, 1231. By exercise of inherent police power, the sovereign, purposing to promote public health, may fairly and reasonably restrict the use of property. BEVERIDGE v. HARPER & TURNER OIL TR. CO., 168 Okla. 609, 35 P. 2d 435. * * * 'A large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature, to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.' 2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. (8th Ed.) p. 1231. 'When the subject lies within the power of the State, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the court but for the legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgments, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set aside because compliance is burdensome.' SPROLES v. BINFORD, 286 U. S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581, 585, 76 L. Ed. 1167.' * * *"

In the Teets case the complaint filed by the employer in the

district court questions the constitutionality of the act which authorizes payment of sixteen weeks unemployment compensation to one who is discharged for misconduct connected with his work.

This case actually involves the disqualification section of the Colorado Employment Security Act, comparable to the disqualification section under the Employment Security Law of North Carolina, and the Supreme Court of Colorado held that such disqualification section was not unconstitutional and did not deprive the employer of property without due process of law. By the same token if the employee had been disqualified under the same section the court would have necessarily held that he was not deprived of benefits without due process of law. We urge the Court to give strong consideration to this case.

In view of the above cases, it is submitted that the North Carolina Legislature in adopting the amendment has not exceeded its constitutional authority.

The appellants in case 451, by their third question, are asking the Court to declare Section 96-14 (4) unconstitutional on the grounds that such section is contrary to the declared public policy of the state as contained in Section 96-2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. (Appendix p 35)

In the STEELMAN Case, Supra, the North Carolina Court stated as follows:

"The appealing employee-claimants take the position that the interpretation of this section is perforce controlled by the declaration of policy contained in Sec. 2 of the Act, the general designation of workers there selected for benefits being those who are 'unemployed through no fault of their own.' The Commission and the court below thought otherwise. They followed the usual and accepted rule of construction that 'where a statute expresses first a general intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the

latter will be taken as an exception from the former and both will stand.' 1 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Constr. (2 Ed.) Sec. 268; ROGERS v. U. S. 185 U. S. 83.

"It is an established canon of construction that where there are two provisions in a statute, one of which is special or particular, and certainly includes the matter in hand, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the particular provisions, the special will be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general provision, as the General Assembly is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict." NANCE v. R. R. 149 N. C. 366, 63 S. E. 116; CRANE v. REEDER, 22 Mich. 322; DAHNKE v. PEOPLE, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197.

The same appellants by their question No. 4 complain that the exactment of contributions from the employer constituted a violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause (3)) because benefits were not paid to them when they were unemployed as a result of a labor dispute in active progress. In the case of GERNATT v. HUIET, 192 Ga. 727, 16 S. E. 2d 587, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated in effect that the section of the unemployment compensation act in respect to the exactment of contributions required from employers was not violative of Article I, Section 8, Clause (3) of the Constitution of the United States, as imposing an unwarranted burden on interstate commerce. In support of this ruling by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the following opinions of the United States Supreme Court were cited: ROBBINS v. SHELBY COUNTY TAXING DISTRICT, 120 U. S. 489, 493, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694; MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY CO. v. HABER, 169 U. S. 613, 628, 18 S. Ct. 488, 42 L. Ed. 878; GLOUCESTER FERRY CO. v. PA. 114 U. S. 196, 215, 5 S. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158; NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO. v. PEOPLE OF NEW YORK, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 17 S. Ct. 418, 41 L. Ed. 853.

The appellants have not shown that undue burden was

placed upon the employer in violation of the commerce clause of the constitution. There are many categories of employees under the respective State Unemployment Compensation Laws which are not entitled to benefits because they do not meet the eligibility requirements, or because they are disqualified from receiving benefits for numerous reasons. It, therefore, cannot be said that the exactment of these contributions from Eastern Air Lines constituted an undue burden under the commerce clause, since benefits were not paid to its employees who were out of work because of a labor dispute in active progress at the establishment of Eastern.

The fifth question attempted to be raised by the same appellants is whether Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina results in disharmony to the declared uniform objectives sought by the Congress through its enactment of the Social Security Act. No disharmony can exist and no Federal question can exist because neither the Social Security Act nor the Federal Unemployment Tax Act sets up standards for the payment of benefits which the states must follow. The states set their own benefit standards as the Federal Act contains no prohibition against it.

In the case of CARMICHAEL, ET AL, v. SOUTHERN COAL & COKE COMPANY, Supra, 301 U. S. 495, in which this Court held that the Alabama Unemployment Compensation Law was constitutional, Justice Stone in speaking on the point attempted to be raised by the appellants in their fifth question stated as follows:

"The Act satisfies the criteria which, by section 903 (a) of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935, c. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 640, 42 U. S. C. § 1103(a), 42 U .S. C. A. § 1103(a), are made prerequisite to its approval by the Social Security Board created by that Act, and it has been approved by the Board as that section directs. By section 902 of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1102, contributors to the state fund are entitled to credit their contributions in satisfaction of the tax imposed on employers by the Social Se-

curity Act, to the extent of 90 per cent of the tax. See Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed.—, decided this day"

Justice Stone further stated in that same case as follows:

"In the court below, the statute was assailed as repugnant to various provisions of the State Constitution. These contentions have been put at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Beeland Wholesale Company v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516, holding the state act valid under both the State and Federal Constitutions."

The Employment Security Law of North Carolina, including the 1961 amendment, has been certified by the Secretary of Labor of the United States to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States as being in conformity with the Social Security Act. (Appendix p. 36a, 38a)

In answer to the sixth question attempted to be raised by these same appellants, the Secretary of Labor has certified that the North Carolina Act is in conformity with the Federal statutes, and certainly, the North Carolina Act would not have been declared in conformity if Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina discriminated in disqualifying individuals unemployed as a result of a labor dispute in active progress.

In answer to the seventh question attempted to be raised by these same appellants, Congress has left it to the states, and to the states alone, the right to pay unemployment insurance benefits under eligibility conditions and disqualifying conditions which the various states, in the discretion of their legislative bodies, feel are best suited to the economic conditions existing in such states. *The Federal Social Security Laws, particularly the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, do not require or contemplate any uniform standards of benefit payments, disqualification or eligibility conditions. Many bills have been introduced in the Congress to amend the social*

security laws and particularly the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, to impose Federal standards upon the states relating to benefit payments. In every instance the Congress has refused to pass such legislation, and has left to the states the prerogative of deciding the benefit standards under the respective state laws.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

A SUMMARY STATEMENT — THE CLASSIFICATION WAS SUPPORTED BY REASON AND BY PRECEDENT

This brings us to the question as to whether the provisions of Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina constitute an unlawful discrimination against the appellants in violation of the rights guaranteed to them by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause (Fourteenth Amendment) of the Constitution of the United States.

On August 14, 1935, the Congress of the United States enacted the Federal Social Security Act. (1935 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, Title 42, U. S. C. A.). It contained a chapter dealing with unemployment compensation. It followed a pattern set by a similar British Act first passed in 1911. It levied a tax (with significant exemptions mentioned) on all employers of eight or more employees for twenty or more weeks in a year.

The states were required to pass state unemployment compensation laws in order that employers might, by paying the state tax, get credit against the Federal unemployment tax.

One of the most significant features of the Federal statute was its selectivity as to employers taxed. It exempted employers of agricultural laborers, domestic servants, certain family members, workers in charitable, religious, scientific, literary and educational undertakings, and others. In the State Acts, the pattern of taxation and exemption was closely

followed. The states drew similar lines with respect to what employers were taxed and as to what employees were entitled to benefits.

All of them drew lines within the protected classes of employees as to what persons were disqualified for benefits. For example, a man who left his work without good cause, a man who had been discharged for misconduct connected with his work, or a man who refused to accept other employment was disqualified.

The statute in each one of the fifty-one jurisdictions contained a provision with respect to unemployment due to labor disputes. The North Carolina provision was typical. The basic provisions of disqualification read as follows:

> "For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed. • • •"

This uniform provision was patterned after the British Act. (National Insurance Act, 1-2 George V, Chapter 55, 1911; Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, January 1958, pages 695, 696.)

Here we get to the very nub of this case on the question of constitutionality. As we later point out, there can be no sound contention of the taking of property, because the employee paid no unemployment tax and made no contribution to the unemployment compensation fund. There can be no sound contention that an employee has been deprived of a right guaranteed to him by any constitution, because no constitution guarantees to any one the right to continuous employment. So, the real question in this case is the question of classification: namely, is the classification of STRIKE-IDLED EMPLOYEES so capricious that no reasonable legislative body could make such classification?

It is not necessary that a legislature spell out its reasons for classification. It is sufficient that a sound reason may exist.

It is very important, we think, to consider what may have been the motivation behind this uniform classification. We will set forth what is so apparent that it must have been a consideration.

The legislative bodies were dealing with the social evil of unemployment. They were taking radical steps to reduce and relieve unemployment. At that time one of the major causes of unemployment in the United States was labor disputes. The future growth of such disputes was certain. If the Sovereign should provide a fund, by taxation of employers, to pay compensation to people who were striking and to people who, though not striking, were made idle because of a strike, then the calling of a strike and the continuing of a strike were made easier for labor. Such a statute would tend to increase the number and the duration of strikes.

Furthermore, the employer of labor would thereby be required by the Sovereign to finance the strike in part. Obviously, it was determined by the legislative bodies that reasonable provision should be made in the statute to prevent (1) the making of strikes easier, and the encouragement of prolonging a strike, and (2) putting a part of the burden of financing the strike upon the employer.

It is important to note here that the motivation for the strike disqualification was different from the motivation for the other disqualifications mentioned above. The latter; namely, disqualification for unwillingness to work and for discharge for misconduct, were directed toward the culpable conduct of the employee. Something that he had done or that he refused to do deserved censure, and that disqualified him. However, in the labor situation, our democracy has taken the position that a man has a right to strike and is not to be censured for doing so. The strike has been regarded as a legi-

timate weapon in the hands of labor in its struggle to acquire status improvements which the employer has denied. Nevertheless, it has been uniformly recognized that strikes are harmful to our general economy, particularly to the operation of our economic machinery. Public policy has been to attempt to avoid strikes wherever possible. For example, the Sovereign takes steps to secure cooling time and mediation.

The Unemployment Compensation National Program is probably the greatest boon which has ever come to industrial labor in the United States. It was truly a magnificent, a "kingly" gift by the Sovereign. But if that great social move should be left in such condition that it would tend to increase and prolong the greatest foreseeable cause of unemployment, the strike, then the move would be substantially self-defeating.

It has been the generally established public policy for the Sovereign to observe, as nearly as possible, a neutral position as between employee and employer in connection with their continuing economic struggle. This is very important, we think.

If strike-idled employees should receive unemployment compensation while so idled, the scales would be heavily weighted on the employee side. The employer would be subject to an additional burden which would handicap him and might destroy him. For example, under the experience rating plan in the North Carolina statute, it can be demonstrated mathematically that an employer who had a very good experience rating in 1960, say three-tenths of 1%, could have his tax rate multiplied nine times (that is to 2.7%) in one year by unemployment compensation payments having been made to his striking employees or to his strike-idled employees. This could increase his North Carolina tax nine times, with no additional Federal credit. How long it would take an employer to regain his former status no one can predict.

So, not only was there a reason to classify strike-idled em-

ployees, but there was a real need to do so. That reason applies with great force to those who are actively engaged in the strike or in supporting it. That reason applies in like manner, but perhaps in less degree, to strike-idled employees who have had no hand or interest in the strike, so-called "innocent" employees.

In every strike causing a stoppage of work, there will probably be so-called "innocent" employees. Not every member of a strike, union or class, desires or seeks the strike. Also, frequently, (by following prescribed legal process of majority vote) a union will represent many members of a class of workers who are not members of the union, do not have any hand in calling the strike, and are opposed to the strike. Frequently a strike by one class of workers may cause work stoppage for other classes of workers.

A strike causing such unemployment does economic harm, not only to the strikers, but also to their FELLOW WORKERS. Certainly the assurance by the Sovereign that in the event of a strike, the strikers' FELLOW WORKERS would receive unemployment compensation would have some tendency to make the decision to strike easier for the strikers. It would remove from their shoulders a part of the responsibility or blame for inflicting harm on those closely associated friends and fellow workers. On the second phase of the reason for disqualification of so-called "innocent" employees, the financial burden on the employer coming from an unemployment compensation payment to a strike-idled non-striker is just as great as such burden from a payment made to a striker. The hardship to the employer in the bargaining processes is just as great.

If a classification of strikers is supportable, then it seems clear that a classification which includes all strike-idled employees would also be supportable. The extension is merely a question of degree and that would lie within the sound discretion of the legislative body.

Therefore, the reason for the strike disqualification in the statute was not to punish the people who were responsible for the strike, but was to refrain from making strikes easier and of longer duration, and to refrain from imposing on the employer the burden of financing a strike in part. These two reasons would apply both to the men responsible for the strike and to the men idled by the strike, even though they had no part in it.

Eight of the jurisdictions, Alabama, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Ohio and Wisconsin, *provided no exception* to the rule that an employee idled by a labor dispute may not draw unemployment benefits. In one state, New York, the total disqualification was for a designated period. In the remainder of those eight jurisdictions, the disqualification was for the total period of work stoppage unemployment.

A ninth jurisdiction, Utah, provided disqualification of those who participated directly or indirectly in the strike and, in addition, those employees who had nothing to do with the strike, but who belonged to the same grade, class or group as the strikers.

The other jurisdictions have exceptions to the blanket disqualification which generally were one or more of the following: not participating in the dispute; not financing in any way the dispute; and not directly interested in the dispute.

As will be pointed out later, North Carolina appears to have first been in the class with Utah, disqualifying also those people who were in the same grade, class or group as the strikers. In 1961, by the amendment here in question, North Carolina moved in the column of the eight listed above.

The statutory provision of all states and the general situation as to disqualification of workers idled by strikes is tabulated and discussed in an article "The Law of Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes" (by Willard A. Lewis,

Attorney and Labor Relations Consultant and Professor of Management and Industrial Relations of New York University), published in the "Labor Law Journal" of February, 1962, pages 174-196. The "Labor Law Journal" is a Commerce Clearing House publication.

In not one of the fifty-one jurisdictions has the general labor dispute disqualification been held invalid. In not one of the nine states mentioned above has the disqualification of establishment employees having no connection with the strike been held invalid.

As we shall point out later, the two key cases going to the Supreme Court of the United States and settling the constitutionality of the unemployment compensation statutes, were cases from New York and Alabama, both of which states had a strike-idled disqualification with no exception.

The important issue in this case is the question whether the classification of all strike-idled plant employees is within the bounds of reason. If so, it, having been made by the legislative body, will not be declared invalid as capricious and beyond the bounds of reason.

In all jurisdictions the legislative bodies have made a separate classification of strike-idled employees. That they have differed as to the extent of the application is merely the result of the legislative exercise of the sound discretion as to just where to draw the classification line.

Another compelling fact is that over a period of many years, in not a single jurisdiction of which we have any knowledge has an appellate court held that the classification of strike-idled employees was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The very fact that the fifty State Acts, the Congressional Act for the District of Columbia, and the British Act have made such a classification would seem to be irrefutable proof that such a classification is not capricious or beyond the bounds of reason.

We shall discuss below the two cases which settle the law in the Supreme Court of the United States and the two cases which appear to have settled the law in North Carolina on the point here involved.

THE NEW YORK CASE — A STATUTE DISQUALIFYING FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ALL EMPLOYEES OF A STRIKE-IDLED ESTABLISHMENT.

The first case to go to the Supreme Court of the United States involving an unemployment compensation statute was from New York. On April 25, 1935, nearly four months before the Federal enactment, but in contemplation of it, New York enacted its unemployment compensation statute. It followed the general pattern as to selectivity and exemptions. It provided for all employees a waiting period of three weeks before entitlement to unemployment compensation. But with respect to strikes, it provided for *all* idled plant employees a waiting period of ten weeks; that is, an additional strike-idled disqualification of seven weeks. The statute said: (Laws of New York, 1935, Vol. 1, p. 1033, Sec. 504) "Waiting Period. (1)" (This provided a waiting period for everyone of three weeks.) "(2) An employee shall not be entitled to benefits except for unemployment which continues subsequent to a waiting period of ten weeks * * * (b) if he has lost his employment because of a strike, lockout, or industrial controversy in the establishment in which he is employed." *There was no exception.*

In this New York case, an employer sought a declaratory judgment in the State Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of New York held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed that holding and determined that the statute was constitutional. CHAMBERLIN v. ANDREWS, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 2d 22, 106 A. L. R. 1519 (April 15, 1936), supra.

The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. We think it was the first such case to reach this Court. On November 23, 1936, the Supreme Court of the United

States, by a Per Curiam opinion, affirmed the decision of the New York Court of Appeals by an equally divided Court. 299 U. S. 515, 81 L. Ed. 380, 57 S. Ct. 122.

But that did not end the interesting history of that case. Motion was made for a rehearing. The Supreme Court delayed action on that motion until May 24, 1937. On that day, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision held a similar Alabama unemployment compensation statute valid. That is the case of CARMICHAEL v. SOUTHERN COAL & COKE CO., Supra, which we discuss in the next division of this Motion. On the day when the five-to-four decision in the CARMICHAEL case came out, the Supreme Court made an entry in its records without further comment, that it overruled the petition to rehear the CHAMBERLIN case. (301 U. S. 714, 81 L. Ed. 1365, 57 S. Ct. 926.) That overruling of the motion to rehear could not have been by an evenly divided Court. So, the CHAMBERLIN case is a precedent. We must presume that the overruling of the motion to rehear was likewise by a five-to-four vote.

New York has not changed its statute providing for a blanket disqualification of strike-idled plant employees. There has been a change as to waiting period. The initial three weeks waiting period which applied to everyone has been reduced to "four effective days." Therefore, the waiting period for strike-idled employees is now seven weeks plus the "four effective days," rather than ten weeks. NEW YORK UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW, Article 18, Title 7, Sections 590-9 and 592-1.

The present status of the New York law is well put by its Supreme Court in CLAIM OF LASHER, et al, 279 N. Y. Appeals Div. 505, 111 N. Y. Supp. 2d 356 (March 12, 1952). Steel workers (producers) struck. Iron workers (construction men) were thrown out of work because of the shortage of steel. The iron workers were held not entitled to compensation. The New York Court said, at p. 358: "Under the employment insurance law adopted in this State, it is of no con-

sequence whatever that the claimants were not on strike; that they were not aiding in the strike, financially or otherwise; that they were employed in a separate branch of work, or that they lost their employment through no fault of their own. Such elements were specifically omitted by the Legislature when our statute was enacted."

THE ALABAMA CASE — THE CASE WHICH ESTABLISHED THE VALIDITY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION STATUTE — ANOTHER STATUTE DISQUALIFYING FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ALL EMPLOYEES OF A STRIKE-IDLED ESTABLISHMENT.

The Alabama unemployment compensation statute (General Statutes of Alabama, 1935, No. 447, enacted September 14, 1935), provided: "Section 6. Benefit Eligibility Conditions * * * (d) During trade disputes, an employee shall not be eligible for benefits in any week in which his total or partial unemployment is directly due to a labor dispute still in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was employed." *There was no exception.*

The Alabama statute in other respects followed the general pattern. An employer, Southern Coal & Coke Company, brought an action against the Attorney General of Alabama, Carmichael, in a three-judge Federal District Court to enjoin the collection of taxes under the Alabama Unemployment Compensation Act. The three-judge Court held that the Act was unconstitutional. It was appealed to the Supreme Court. This Court held in a five-to-four decision, as heretofore described, that the statute was constitutional. CARMICHAEL v. SOUTHERN COAL & COKE CO., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 57 S. Ct. 868, argued April 7 and 8, 1937; decided May 24, 1937. In that case, there was a long opinion by Justice Stone in which he discussed the merits of the statute and of the attacks on it. The opinion deals definitely with the validity of the classifications and exemptions contained in the statute and holds that they were reasonable.

The court said, in part, page 509:

"A legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny, they MUST BE PRESUMED TO REST ON THAT BASIS IF THERE IS ANY CONCEIVABLE STATE OF FACTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT IT. * * *" (Emphasis added)

Page 519:

"What we have said as to the validity of the choice of the subjects of the tax is applicable in large measure to the choice of beneficiaries of the relief. In establishing a system of unemployment benefits the legislature is not bound to occupy the whole field. * * *"

THE NORTH CAROLINA CASES

The first North Carolina case is that of IN RE STEELMAN, Supra. In that case Chief Justice Stacy stated as follows:

"It thus appears that the State seeks to be neutral in the labor dispute as far as practicable, and to grant benefits only in conformity to such neutrality. Of course, it is recognized that in a matter of this kind, some allowance must be made in fixing the line or point of difference between granting and withholding benefits during the stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute. SUPPLY CO. v. MAXWELL, 212 N. C. 624, 194 S. E. 117. 'But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.' * * * MR. JUSTICE HOLMES IN LOUISVILLE GAS CO. v. COLEMAN, 277 U. S. 32. The wisdom or impolicy of such decision belongs to the legislative, and not to the judicial, department of the Government. UNITED STATES v. F. W. DARBY LUM-

BER CO., ____ U. S. ____, decided 3 February 1941 — (Fair Labor Standards Case).

"* * *

"Accordant with the terms of this section, the Commission found that the employee-claimants, appellants herein, were not entitled to benefits during the stoppage of work at the factory, establishment, or other premises of the Nebel Knitting Company because it appeared from the evidence that they were either (a) participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, or (b) that they belonged to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurred, some of whom were participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. The ruling of the Commission was upheld on appeal to the Superior Court. It is supported by the language of the statute and the evidence in the case."

Certainly from that opinion, it appears that the disqualification was extended to persons who participated in no way in the labor dispute. It is a firm precedent for the conclusion that a classification which includes "innocent" employees is not invalid for that reason.

An even stronger case is that of UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION v. MARTIN, 228 N. C. 277, 45 S. E. 2d 385. This case involved workers in a hosiery mill and some two hundred employees were employed in the finishing department known as dyers, boarders, pairers, transfer girls, rider girls, folders and packers. There was a labor dispute and strike between the boarders who were "unionized" and the employer. This caused a complete stoppage of work in the entire finishing department. The boarders constituted only a small segment of the workers in the finishing department. No other individuals in the finishing department participated in the strike, and none were interested in it; nevertheless, all

of them were disqualified from receiving benefits because they belonged to a grade or class of workers some of whom (the boarders) participated in and were directly interested in the labor dispute. In that case Chief Justice Stacy stated as follows:

> "The question for decision is whether the employee-claimants (other than the boarders) who were not directly interested in the labor dispute which brought about the stoppage of work, AND DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN OR HELP FINANCE OR BENEFIT FROM THE DISPUTE, are disqualified for benefits because they belonged to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurred, some of whom (the boarders) were participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. The Superior Court answered in the affirmative, and we approve on authority of what was said in the case of IN RE STEELMAN, 219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. 2d 544." (Emphasis added)

The great significance of the MARTIN case is that the Court approved as reasonable the classification which embraced people who not only were not causing, aiding or abetting the strike, but who had no interest in it. The Court having approved the placing of the line there, it would seem to follow that the placing of the line to include all strike-idled plant employees is merely a matter of degree within the discretion of the Legislature.

THERE ARE OBVIOUS AND SOUND REASONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION DISQUALIFYING FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS ALL STRIKE-IDLED EMPLOYEES IN AN ESTABLISHMENT.

The practical consideration affecting the disqualification of strike-idled employees are discussed in the article heretofore referred to by Willard A. Lewis in the Labor Law Journal,

February 1962. He says there, in part: (pages 174, 175)

"The right of States to deny unemployment compensation to employees made idle by labor disputes obviously can exert a powerful influence on bargaining strategies. Its impact registers on both sides.

"* * *

"In New York, for example, the first eight weeks (including a one-week waiting period) of unemployment due to a 'strike, lockout or other industrial controversy' are non-compensable. Strikers in the dispute are disqualified for UC until the eight-week period (or the labor dispute) ends. So are *non-strikers*—those employees of the company who are not on strike but who find themselves out of work because of the plant shutdown caused by the strike. How this can affect bargaining strategy was summed up by one union official in these words: 'If it lasts eight weeks, then I know I have a strike going.' * * *"

In Report No. 245 of the House of Representatives 80th Congress, First Session, when Congress was considering the Taft-Hartley Act, there appears the following:

"During the last few years the effects of industrial strife have at times brought our country to the brink of a general economic paralysis. Employees have suffered; employers have suffered; and above all the public has suffered. The enactment of comprehensive legislation to define clearly the legitimate rights of employers and employees in their industrial relations in keeping with the protection of the paramount public interest is imperative."

The North Carolina Legislature when it enacted the 1961 amendment felt that it was imperative to cease paying strike-idled employees even after the "stoppage of work" ceased but so long as the labor dispute was in active progress.

It is submitted that we have shown the purposes behind

the labor dispute provision in the North Carolina law and the reason for the 1961 amendment under which the appellants in this case were disqualified. It is further submitted that the purposes for which it was enacted are reasonable justification for the classification as contained in that amendment. The appellants certainly have not been deprived of any property for there was never any tax imposed upon them. No money of theirs has ever gone into the trust fund and they have no property rights in it. They have had no vested right taken from them. Certainly, no one has a vested right to be protected financially from the hardship of unemployment. To the contrary, if this were true, then every unemployment compensation statute in the United States would be invalid because they would discriminate between classes of employees. As an example, the granting of benefits to employees of a hotel while denying benefits to employees of denominational or educational institutions.

CONCLUSIONS

It is submitted that Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina is not repugnant to any law of the United States. The Employment Security Law of North Carolina, including the 1961 amendment to Section 96-14(4), has been certified by the Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of the Treasury as being in conformity with the Federal statutes.

It is further submitted that Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina is not repugnant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution as no undue burden has been imposed upon the employer, Eastern Air Lines, by reason of the denial of benefits to its strike-idled workers.

It is further submitted that Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes of North Carolina is not repugnant to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution for the reasons set forth in this motion.

It is further submitted that the North Carolina Legislature

in adopting the 1961 amendment to Section 96-14(4) of the General Statutes did not exceed the police powers vested in it.

For the reasons set forth in this motion, and the cases previously decided by this Court and by the Courts of the several states, the appellee moves the Court to dismiss these appeals for the reason that the questions attempted to be raised by the appellants have been decided and set at rest by this Court, and any Federal questions attempted to be raised by the appellants are unsubstantial.

Respectfully submitted,

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Employment Security Commission
of North Carolina
Raleigh, North Carolina
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APPENDIX

Case Nos. 450-451

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APPENDIX

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA

July 18, 1962

Decision of R. B. Overton,
Special Appeals Deputy

Decision No. 541-L

In the Matter of:

J. K. ABERNATHY
SS No. 244-42-7854

Employee, et al, and
Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated,
Employer.

ISSUE: Labor Dispute — Section 96-14(4) of the Employment Security Law of North Carolina.

Statement of Case:

This matter coming on to be heard and being heard before the undersigned Special Appeals Deputy on July 12, 1962, in the Superior Court Room, Mecklenburg County Courthouse, Charlotte, North Carolina, after due notice to all parties. The purpose of the hearing was to determine if the unemployment of the employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, beginning June 23, 1962, was due to a labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which they are or were last employed, and further to determine if such individuals are disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits by reason thereof. Ap-

pearances were Mr. Warren C. Stack and Mr. James L. Cole of the law offices of Mr. Warren C. Stack, Attorney, 900 Wachovia Bank Building, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing the Airline Pilots Association, and Mr. Ernest W. Machen and Mr. J. W. Alexander, Jr., of the law firm of Blakeney, Alexander & Machen, North Carolina National Bank Building, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing all employees except pilots and flight engineers, and Mr. Harold N. Hill, Jr., of the law firm of Gambrell, Harlan, Russell, Moye & Richardson, Suite 825, C & S Bank Building, Atlanta, Georgia, representing Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Also present was Mr. Malcolm F. Plaeger of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and Mr. M. I. Perkins, Charlotte Station Manager, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and a group of approximately three hundred employees.

Findings of Facts

1. Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, hereinafter referred to as the employer, is a corporation engaged in the business of operating an air transport system, whereby passengers and cargo are transported in interstate commerce by means of airplanes, serving twenty-six states in the eastern half of the United States and one hundred and twenty cities, and in addition thereto serving Mexico City, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, and Canada.

2. The employer employs seventeen thousand nine hundred and six employees throughout its system with between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred being based in North Carolina working at or out of the airports and/or cities served in this State.

3. The classifications of the employees utilized by the employer consist of various skills and vocations, among which are mechanics and related skills, pilots, stewards and stewardesses, flight engineers, communications workers, dispatchers, and various clerical workers, and others, including some non-union personnel.

4. The employees are represented by the following unions or associations according to their skills and vocations: (1) International Association of Machinists; (2) Airline Pilots Association; (3) Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association; (4) Flight Engineers International Association; (5) Communication Workers of America Union; and (6) Airline Dispatchers Association. Such unions or associations have been duly certified under the Federal Statutes as the bargaining agent for their members and all other personnel performing similar or related duties.

5. That in its system the employer employs five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers whose services are utilized on four-engine aircraft. Some such four-engine aircraft land and take off with passengers and cargo at all airports in the system located in North Carolina; namely, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham, and Greensboro-High Point, taking on passengers and cargo at each airport as the necessity arises. That none of the flight engineers are based in North Carolina, although they fly in and out of the various North Carolina airports on schedules of all four-motored airplanes serving North Carolina.

6. That on June 23, 1962, the five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers went on strike and refused to carry out their work assignments. This strike and refusal to work was in protest of the failure of the employer and the bargaining agent representing flight engineers to reach an agreement as to the qualifications of the flight engineers, there being a difference of opinion between such parties as to whether the flight engineers should also be qualified as pilots.

7. That in consequence of the strike of the flight engineers the employer cancelled all flights and furloughed several thousand employees, including its employees in North Carolina, a list of which is hereto attached marked "Exhibit A." That those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" hereto attached have been unemployed since June 23, 1962, and their unemployment is due to the dispute or controversy

in existence between the flight engineers and the employer. That the controversy between the flight engineers and the employer was still in existence as of the date of the hearing before the undersigned Special Appeals Deputy.

8. That prior to June 23, 1962, the President of the United States appointed an Emergency Presidential Board for the special purpose of hearing the differences between the flight engineers and the employer with instructions to recommend a settlement of such differences. That such Emergency Presidential Board made its recommendation and the bargaining agent representing the flight engineers refused to accept all recommendations as submitted, particularly refusing to accept the recommendation that the qualifications of the flight engineers be arbitrated. That settlement of such controversy was still pending at the time of the hearing before the undersigned Special Appeals Deputy, and that all those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" were still unemployed as of the date of the hearing before the undersigned Special Appeals Deputy.

9. That in addition to those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A," five individuals, namely: Marian J. Hehs, S. S. No. 294-32-8207, Edwin D. Meador, S. S. No. 223-16-0879; Henry Scott McConnell, S. S. No. 223-20-4378; Linda Lee Emory, S. S. No. 244-66-8294, and Frances Gail Hartness, S. S. No. 240-66-5700, have filed claims against the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina on interstate claims, such individuals having been transferred from employment in North Carolina to other points on the system of the employer and having been laid off for the same reason as those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A."

Reasons and Conclusions of Law:

Under the provision of the Employment Security Law of North Carolina, namely: Section 96-14(4), it is provided as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

"(4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed . . . ."

The 1961 Legislature re-wrote the above section of the Employment Security Law to read as above set forth. Prior to July 1, 1961, this specific section of the law read as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

"(4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that —

"a. He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and

"b. He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute: . . . ."

During the month of March 1961, this deputy was called upon to pass on the eligibility of the employees of this employer, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, for unemployment insurance benefits during a strike called by the identical union that called the strike in this case, such strike having been called for the same reason — a dispute over the qualifications of the flight engineers.

In deciding that case, the same being Decision No. 518-L, it was ruled that all individuals who were unemployed in consequence of a stoppage of work attributable to a labor dispute at the plant or premises of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, were eligible with the exception of the flight engineers, pilots, and flight attendants, it being concluded that the pilots, flight engineers, and flight attendants were in a different class from other employees, and, therefore, the other employees came within the exceptions as set forth in the statute in effect at that time. It will be noted that under the law in effect prior to July 1, 1961, it was provided that the disqualifications prescribed by the statute should not apply if it was shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that such individuals were not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute, and that they did not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurred, any of whom were participating in, or financing, or directly interested in the dispute.

In amending and re-writing the disqualifying section applicable to labor disputes, the 1961 Legislature did not retain any of the provisions of the prior law providing exceptions thereto. Therefore, the statute as now written is interpreted to mean that all individuals who become unemployed by reason of a labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which they are or were last employed must be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, irrespective of the grade or class of such individuals or their interest in the dispute or their participation in the dispute.

The question then presents itself as to whether a labor dispute was in active progress at the factory, establishment, or premises of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated. From the findings of fact above set forth it is concluded that a labor dispute was in active progress between Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and the flight engineers on June 23, 1962, at the time of the strike or walkout of the flight engineers, and that such labor dispute was still in active progress as of July 12, 1962. It is further concluded that the phrase "at the factory, establishment, or other premises," as used in the statute and as applicable to this case, encompasses the entire system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated. It, therefore, follows that any of the individuals employed in the system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, who are unemployed must be disqualified from receiving benefits under the Employment Security Law of North Carolina as long as such labor dispute continues in active progress.

Decision:

It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Marian J. Hehs, S. S. No. 294-32-8207; Edwin D. Meador, S. S. No. 223-16-0879; Henry Scott McConnell, S. S. No. 223-20-4378; Linda Lee Emory, S. S. No. 244-66-8294; and Frances Gail Hartness, S. S. No. 240-66-5700; and all those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" shall be and the same are disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits beginning June 23, 1962, through July 12, 1962, and continuing as long as the labor dispute between Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and the flight engineers remains in active progress and their unemployment is caused thereby.

R. B. OVERTON
Special Appeals Deputy

Decision Mailed: July 18, 1962
Appeal Rights Expire: July 30, 1962.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION
OF NORTH CAROLINA

August 10, 1962

Decision of the Full Commission

Decision No. 3301

In the Matter of:

J. K. ABERNATHY
SS No. 244-42-7854

Employee, et al

Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated
Employer

Section 96-14 (4) — Labor Dispute: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed. Provided, that an individual disqualified under the provisions of this subdivision shall continue to be disqualified thereunder after the labor dispute has ceased to be in active progress for such period of time as is reasonably necessary and required to physically resume operations in the method of operating in use at the plant, factory, or establishment of the employing unit."

Origin of Appeal:

This cause came on to be heard by and before the Full Commission at its office in Raleigh, North Carolina, on Friday, August 10, 1962, after due notice of hearing to the interested parties. The purpose of the hearing was to pass upon the appeals filed on behalf of the employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, to a decision of the Special Appeals Deputy, No. 541-L, and for the purpose of a Commission review of the decisions of the Special Appeals Deputy numbers 543-L, 544-L and 546-L, involving other employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and for the purpose of passing upon a claim filed in Chicago, Illinois, by one Frances G. Arrowood, SS No. 243-60-1009, said claim having been removed to the Full Commission as a result of an order of the Chairman dated August 8, 1962. R. F. Martin, Director Unemployment Insurance Division, made a formal request to remove such claim so that it might be reviewed along with the other matters on appeal before the Commission. The hearing was also held for the purpose of determining whether all of such claimant-employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, should be disqualified under the provisions of Section 96-14 (4) of the Employment Security Law. Appearances before the Commission were Mr. Ernest W. Machen of the law firm of Blakeney, Alexander & Machen, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing all employees except pilots and flight engineers, and Mr. James L. Cole of the law office of Mr. Warren C. Stack, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing the Airline Pilots Association. Also present were Mr. Malcolm F. Plaeger, Area Manager for Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, Charlotte, North Carolina, J. T. Brosnan, Station Manager, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, Raleigh-Durham Airport, J. W. Goodwin, Sales Manager, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, Raleigh, North Carolina, and H. N. Schofield, Operations Supervisor, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, Raleigh-Durham Airport. In addition, there was also present a small group of employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated. The case was presented to the Commission by W. D. Holoman, Chief Counsel.

Findings of Fact:

1. Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, hereinafter referred to as the employer, is a corporation engaged in the business of commercial air transportation, transporting passengers, U. S. mail, and cargo in interstate commerce by means of airplanes, serving twenty-six States in the eastern half of the United States and one hundred and twenty cities, and in addition thereto, serving Mexico City, Puerto Rico, Bermuda and Canada.

2. The employer normally employs seventeen thousand nine hundred and six employees throughout its system with between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred being based in North Carolina working at or out of the airports and/or cities served in this State.

3. The classification of the employees utilized by the employer consists of various skills and vocations, among which are mechanics and related skills, pilots, stewards, stewardesses, flight engineers, communication workers, dispatchers, and various clerical workers, and others, including some nonunion personnel.

4. The employees of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, are represented through its system by the following unions or associations according to their skills and vocations: (1) International Association of Machinists; (2) Airline Pilots Association; (3) Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association; (4) Flight Engineers International Association; (5) Communication Workers of America Union, and (6) Airline Dispatchers Association. Such unions or associations have been duly certified under the Federal Statutes as the bargaining agents for their members and all other personnel performing similar or related duties, and such bargaining is on a system-wide basis.

5. In its system the employer employs five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers whose services are utilized on

four-engine aircraft throughout its system. Some of such four-engine aircraft land and take off with passengers and cargo at all airports in the system located in North Carolina; namely, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-High Point, taking on passengers and cargo at each airport as the necessity arises. Jet planes belonging to the employer also land and take off from the airport in Charlotte taking passengers and cargo to and from that airport as the necessity arises. Flight engineers are employed and used on all four-engine and jet aircraft landing and taking off in North Carolina. None of the flight engineers are based in North Carolina although they fly in and out of the various airports on schedules of four-motored piston driven planes and all jet planes serving North Carolina. The flight engineers perform services at each of the company's facilities in North Carolina and elsewhere throughout its entire system. When the four-engine piston driven planes and jet planes land at the North Carolina airports, the flight engineers inspect the planes for safety and airworthiness and determine the distribution of gasoline.

6. Approximately thirty-five percent of the planes used by the employer in its system are two-engine piston aircraft and on all two-engine aircraft the services of flight engineers are not used. Approximately sixty-five percent of the planes used by the employer in its system consist of four-engine piston planes and jets, all of which utilize the services of flight engineers.

7. On June 23, 1962, the five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers went on strike and refused to carry out their work assignments. This strike and refusal to work was in protest of the failure of the employer and the bargaining agent representing the flight engineers to reach an agreement as to the qualifications of the flight engineers, there being a difference of opinion between such parties as to whether the flight engineers should also be qualified as pilots. Beginning on June 23, 1962, and continuing through the date of the hearing by the Special Appeals Deputy on July 12,

1962, the flight engineers failed and refused to perform their services in bringing planes in and out of the facilities of the employer in North Carolina, and elsewhere.

8. In consequence of the strike of the flight engineers, the employer cancelled all flights and furloughed several thousand employees, including its employees in North Carolina, a list of which is hereto attached and marked "Exhibit A." Those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" hereto attached were unemployed beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy, and the unemployment is due to the dispute or controversy in existence between the flight engineers and the employer; that the controversy between the flight engineers and the employer was still in existence as of the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy on July 12, 1962.

9. Prior to June 23, 1962, the President of the United States appointed an Emergency Presidential Board for the special purpose of hearing the differences between the flight engineers and the employer with instructions to recommend a settlement of such differences. Such Emergency Presidential Board made its recommendations and the bargaining agent representing the flight engineers refused to accept all recommendations as submitted, particularly refusing to accept the recommendation that the qualifications of the flight engineers be arbitrated. The settlement of such controversy was still pending at the time of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy, and all those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" were still unemployed as of the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy.

Issue:

What are the claimant-employees' rights to benefits under the Employment Security Law?

Reasons and Conclusions of Law:

Under the provisions of the Employment Security Law of North Carolina; namely, Section 96-14 (4), it is provided as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

"(4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed. . . ."

The 1961 Legislature re-wrote Section 96-14 (4) of the Employment Security Law to read as above set forth. Prior to July 1, 1961, this specific section of the law read as follows:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

"(4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that the total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work that exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission—

"a. He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and

"b. He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of

which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. . . ."

During the month of March 1961, a Special Appeals Deputy was called upon to pass on the eligibility of the employees of this employer, Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, for unemployment insurance benefits during a strike called by the identical union that called the strike in this case, such strike having been called for the same reason — a dispute over the qualifications of the flight engineers.

In deciding that case, the same being Decision No. 518-L, it was ruled that all individuals who were unemployed in consequence of a stoppage of work attributable to a labor dispute at the plant or premises of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, were eligible with the exception of the flight engineers, pilots, and flight attendants, it being concluded that the pilots, flight engineers, and flight attendants were in a different class from other employees and, therefore, the other employees came within the exceptions set forth in the statute in effect at that time. It will be noted that under the law in effect prior to July 1, 1961, it was provided that the disqualification prescribed by the statute should not apply if it was shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that such individuals were not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute, and that they did not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurred, any of whom were participating in, or financing, or directly interested in the dispute.

In amending and re-writing the disqualifying section applicable to labor disputes, the 1961 Legislature did not retain any of the provisions of the prior law providing exceptions thereto. The statute, therefore, as now written, is interpreted to mean that all individuals who become unemployed by

reason of a labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which they are or were last employed, must be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, irrespective of the grade or class of such individuals or their interest in the dispute or their participation in the dispute.

The question then presents itself as to whether a labor dispute was in active progress at the factory, establishment, or premises of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated. From the findings of fact set forth above it is concluded that a labor dispute was in active progress between Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and the flight engineers on June 23, 1962, at the time of the strike or walkout of the flight engineers, and that such labor dispute was still in active progress as of July 12, 1962.

The record shows that when the four-engine piston driven planes and jet planes land or take off at the North Carolina airports, the flight engineers inspect the planes for safety and airworthiness and determine the distribution of gasoline. It is reasonable to conclude and it is so concluded that they perform similar services at all of the facilities of the company throughout its system, and also perform services on the planes while in the air. The service of the flight engineers were necessary to the conduct of the usual business of the company at all three airports in North Carolina, as their services were required on all four-engine piston driven and jet planes landing at all three airports in this State. The services of the flight engineers and other personnel on the four-engine craft and jets are not performed solely at their base or bases of their operations, but throughout the entire system, including the three airports in North Carolina.

The flight engineers failed and refused to perform their services in bringing the planes in and out of the company's facilities in North Carolina as well as all of the other facilities of the company throughout its system. It is concluded that such failure on the part of the flight engineers constituted a

strike, both in North Carolina, and elsewhere throughout the system, which resulted in the grounding of four-engine piston driven planes and jet planes, which constituted approximately sixty-five percent of the company's business. As a result of the strike of the flight engineers, the services performed by the North Carolina employees were affected to the extent that their services were not needed and the company was forced to cancel all flights and close down operations at all of the facilities throughout its system. It can only be concluded that the establishment, as contemplated by the statutes, is not and cannot be said to be confined to one facility or to one State, but covers all facilities in the company's system because of the nature of its operations and because the services of one group of employees is dependent upon the services of other groups. It is, therefore, concluded that the phrase "at the factory, establishment, or other premises" as used in the statute, which is applicable to this case, encompasses the entire system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated. It, therefore, follows that any of the individuals in the system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, who are unemployed due to the labor dispute must be disqualified from receiving benefits under the Employment Security Law of North Carolina as long as such labor dispute continues in active progress.

It is concluded that all individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" hereto attached were unemployed beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, and their unemployment was due to a labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment or other premises at which they were last employed. Consequently, all of the individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" hereto attached must be disqualified from receiving benefits beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, and continuing thereafter so long as the labor dispute between Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and the flight engineers remains in active progress and their unemployment is caused thereby.

In the determination of this case, the Commission con-

sidered what it believed to be the intent of the Legislature when it passed Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes. The wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The unmistakable legislative intent is plainly spelled out in Section 96-14 (4) of the General Statutes. It will be noted from such section that an individual shall be disqualified for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed. It is that portion of Section 96-14 (4) which we are considering in this case as it has been established that the phrase "at the factory, establishment, or other premises," as used in the statute, encompasses the entire system of Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and not just a segment thereof. It should be pointed out, however, that Section 96-14 (4) further provides that if such individual is unemployed because of a labor dispute in active progress at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed and *which supplies material and services necessary to the continued and usual operations of the premises at which he is or was last employed*, he is likewise disqualified from receiving benefits so long as the labor dispute is in active progress.

It is obvious from this latter portion of Section 96-14 (4) that it was the intent of the Legislature to disqualify individuals from receiving benefits even if there were no labor dispute in active progress here in North Carolina, but if there was a labor dispute in active progress at another place owned by the employer, which supplies materials and services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which the individuals in North Carolina were employed. So, even if there had been no labor dispute in active progress at the establishment or other premises of the employer in this State, the claimants in this proceeding would have been disqualified by reason of a labor dispute in active progress at another place owned by the employer.

Decision:

It is now, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that Marian J. Hehs, SS No. 294-32-8207; Edwin D. Meador, SS No. 223-16-0879, Henry Scott McConnell, SS No. 223-20-4378; Linda Lee Emory, SS No. 244-66-8294; Frances Gail Hartness, SS No. 240-66-5700, and Frances G. Arrowood, SS No. 243-60-1009, and all those individuals whose names appear on "Exhibit A" shall be and the same are disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, and continuing as long as the labor dispute between Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, and the flight engineers remains in active progress and their unemployment is caused thereby.

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION
OF NORTH CAROLINA

/s/ Henry E. Kendall
Henry E. Kendall,
Chairman.

ATTEST:
/s/ R. F. Martin
R. F. Martin,
Secretary

NOTICE: Any party aggrieved by this decision may appeal to the Superior Court by:

(1) Giving written notice of the appeal to the Employment Security Commission, Box 589, Raleigh, North Carolina, within ten (10) days from the date this decision is mailed; and

(2) If the grounds of the appeal are not stated at the time the notice of appeal is filed, the party must file with the Commission a statement giving

the grounds of his appeal within twenty (20) da
from the date this decision is mailed.

Appeal Entered:	June 28, 1962
Case Received:	August 8, 1962
Decision Mailed:	August 31, 1962

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF MECKLENBURG

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

In the Matter of:

J. K. ABERNATHY
SS No. 244-42-7854
Employee, et al

and

Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated
Employer

and

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
COMMISSION
of North Carolina
Raleigh, North Carolina

} JUDGMENT

This cause, coming on to be heard and being heard before the undersigned Judge Presiding over the October 22, 1962, Special B Civil Term of Mecklenburg County Superior Court upon appeals from a decision of the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina rendered on August 31, 1962, entitled "In The Matter Of: J. K. Abernathy, SS No. 224-42-7854, Employee, et al, and Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated, Employer," Decision No. 3301, pursuant to Notice of Appeal filed on September 4, 1962, in behalf of the employee-claimants who are members of the Charlotte Council of the Air Line Pilots Association and Notice of Appeal filed on September 7, 1962, in behalf of all other employee-claimants covered by Decision No. 3301, Formal Statement of Grounds of Appeal having been filed on September 6, 1962, in behalf of the claimants who are members of the Charlotte Council of

the Air Line Pilots Association, and Statement of Grounds for Review and Exceptions to the Commission's Decision having been filed on September 15, 1962, in behalf of all other employee-claimants covered by Decision No. 3301, all in accordance with the provisions of North Carolina General Statutes Section 96-15, Subparagraph (i);

AND THE COURT having heard argument of counsel for each of the above described categories of claimants and argument of General Counsel for the Employment Security Commission, and having considered the entire record as returned to this Court pursuant to the requirements of the above mentioned Section of the General Statutes, and being otherwise fully advised as to all manners pertinent to said appeal;

AND THE COURT being of the opinion that the Employment Security Commission is in error in finding and concluding that the claimants are disqualified from receiving Employment Security benefits by reason of the provisions of G. S. 96-14(4) upon the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence in the record, and that its decision is therefore in error and should be set aside; AND THE COURT being of the further opinion that if, upon the record before the Commission, the provisions of G. S. 96-14(4) should be construed as imposing a disqualification upon the appealing claimants who are otherwise eligible for unemployment benefits, then the provisions of G. S. 96-14(4), as so applied under the facts and circumstances of this case established by the record herein, constitute an unlawful discrimination against these claimants in violation of rights guaranteed to them by the Statutes and Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Decision No. 3301 rendered by the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina on August 31, 1962, be and the same is hereby reversed and set aside.

THIS THE 25th DAY OF OCTOBER, 1962.

/s/ H. L. Riddle, Jr.
Judge Presiding

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

SPRING TERM, 1963

In the Matter of J. K. ABERNATHY SS No. 244-42-7854 Employee, et al Eastern Air Lines, Incorporated Employer and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION of North Carolina Raleigh, North Carolina	No. 233 — FROM MECKLENBURG

Appeal by the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina from Riddle, S. J., October, 1962 Special "B" Term, Mecklenburg Superior Court.

This proceeding was instituted before the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, hereafter called the Commission, by J. K. Abernathy and others, employees of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (hereafter called Eastern), who filed claims for unemployment insurance benefits during the time they were out of work or furloughed from their jobs as a result of a labor dispute between the flight engineers and Eastern. In due course the Chairman of the Commission ordered the claims referred to R. B. Overton, Special Appeals Deputy, for hearing and disposition. After due notice, the interested parties appeared before Mr. Overton on July 12, 1962. After concluding the hearing on July 18, 1962, the Appeals Commissioner made detailed findings of fact, stated con-

clusions of law, and ordered that "all those individuals whose names appear on 'Exhibit A' shall be and the same are disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits beginning June 23, 1962, through July 12, 1962, and continuing as long as the labor dispute between Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and the flight engineers remain in active progress and their unemployment is caused thereby."

The parties adversely affected by the finding, conclusion, and order of the Special Appeals Deputy, including the director, Unemployment Insurance Division, petitioned for and were granted a review by the full Commission. Hearing on review by the Commission began on August 10, 1962. At the conclusion of the hearing the Commission (among other things not deemed essential to the dispute) made these findings:

"1. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the employer, is a corporation engaged in the business of commercial air transportation, transporting passengers, U. S. mail, and cargo in interstate commerce by means of airplanes serving twenty-six states in the eastern half of the United States and one hundred and twenty cities, and in addition thereto, serving Mexico City, Puerto Rico, Bermuda and Canada.

"2. The employer normally employs seventeen thousand nine hundred and six employees throughout its system with between six hundred and fifty and seven hundred being based in North Carolina working at or out of the airports and/or cities served in this State.

"3. The classification of the employees utilized by the employer consists of various skills and vocations, among which are mechanics and related skills, pilots, stewards, stewardesses, flight engineers, communication workers, dispatchers, and various clerical workers, and others, including some non-union personnel.

"4. The employees of Eastern Air Lines, Inc. are repre-

sented through its system by the following unions or associations according to their skills and vocations: (1) International Association of Machinists; (2) Airline Pilots Association; (3) Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association; (4) Flight Engineers International Association; (5) Communication Workers of America Union; and (6) Airline Dispatchers Association. Such unions or associations have been duly certified under the Federal Statutes as the bargaining agents for their members and all other personnel performing similar or related duties, and such bargaining is on a system-wide basis.

"5. In its system the employer employs five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers whose services are utilized on four-engine aircraft throughout its system. Some of such four-engine aircraft land and take off with passengers and cargo at all airports in the system located in North Carolina; namely, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-High Point, taking on passengers and cargo at each airport as the necessity arises. Jet planes belonging to the employer also land and take off from the airport in Charlotte taking passengers and cargo to and from that airport as the necessity arises. Flight engineers are employed and used on all four-engine and jet aircraft landing and taking off in North Carolina. None of the flight engineers are based in North Carolina although they fly in and out of the various airports on schedules of four-motored piston driven planes and all jet planes serving North Carolina. The flight engineers perform services at each of the company's facilities in North Carolina and elsewhere throughout its entire system. When the four-engine piston driven planes and jet planes land at the North Carolina airports, the flight engineers inspect the planes for safety, airworthiness and determine the distribution of gasoline.

"6. Approxixmately thirty-five per cent of the planes used by the employer in its system are two-engine aircraft and on all the two-engine aircraft the services of flight engineers are not used. Approximately sixty-five per cent of

the planes used by the employer in its system consist of four-engine piston planes and jets, all of which utilize the services of flight engineers.

"7. On June 23, 1962, the five hundred and seventy-five flight engineers went on strike and refused to carry out their work assignments. This strike and refusal to work was in protest of the failure of the employer and the bargaining agent representing the flight engineers to reach an agreement as to the qualifications of the flight engineers, there being a difference of opinion between such parties as to whether the flight engineers should also be qualified as pilots. Beginning on June 23, 1962, and continuing through the date of the hearing by the Special Appeals Deputy on July 12, 1962, the flight engineers failed and refused to perform their services in bringing planes in and out of the facilities of the employer in North Carolina, and elsewhere.

"8. In consequence of the strike of the flight engineers, the employer cancelled all flights and furloughed several thousand employees, including its employees in North Carolina, a list of which is hereto attached and marked 'Exhibit A.' Those individuals whose names appear on 'Exhibit A' hereto attached were unemployed beginning June 24, 1962, through July 12, 1962, the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy, and their unemployment is due to the dispute or controversy in existence between the flight engineers and the employer; that the controversy between the flight engineers and the employer was still in existence as of the date of the hearing before the Special Appeals Deputy on July 12, 1962. * * *"

"From the findings of fact . . . it is concluded that a labor dispute was in active progress between Eastern Air Lines, Inc., and the flight engineers on June 23, 1962, at the time of the strike or walkout of the flight engineers, and that such labor dispute was still in active progress as of July 12, 1962." The Commission, by Decision No. 3301, denied the claims upon the ground that G. S. 96-14 (4) disqualified the laid-off

employees for insurance benefits. Upon appeal and after hearing, the Superior Court entered the following order:

"AND THE COURT being of the opinion that the Employment Security Commission is in error in finding and concluding that the claimants are disqualified from receiving Employment Security benefits by reason of the provisions of G. S. 96-14 (4) upon the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence in the record, and that its decision is therefore in error and should be set aside; AND THE COURT being of the further opinion that if, upon the record before the Commission, the provisions of G. S. 96-14 (4) should be construed as imposing a disqualification upon the appealing claimants who are otherwise eligible for unemployment benefits, then the provisions of G. S. 96-14 (4), as so applied under the facts and circumstances of this case established by the record herein, constitute an unlawful discrimination against these claimants in violation of rights guaranteed to them by the Statutes and Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.

"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Decision No. 3301 rendered by the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina on August 31, 1962, be and the same is hereby reversed and set aside."

The Employment Security Commission of North Carolina appealed.

W. D. Holoman, R. B. Billings, D. G. Ball, for the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, appellant

Gambrell, Harlan, Russell, Moye & Richardson,

By: E. Smythe Gambrell, William G. Bell, Jr., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Sidney F. Wheeler, for Eastern Air Lines, Inc., appellee

Blakeney, Alexander & Machen,

By: Bailey Patrick, Jr., for North Carolina Employees of Eastern Air Lines, Inc., except the 123 Captains and Air Line Pilots based in North Carolina, appellees

Warren C. Stack,

By: James L. Cole, for Charlotte Council, Air Line Pilots Association, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., appellees

Joyner & Howison,

By: William T. Joyner, for Harriet Cotton Mills and Henderson Cotton Mills, *amicus curiae*

HIGGINS, J.

Here for review is the Superior Court judgment that the Employment Security Commission committed error (1) "In finding and concluding that claimants are disqualified from receiving Employment Security benefits by reason of the provisions of G. S. 96-14 (4) upon the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence in the record, . . ." and (2) If the 1961 amendment should be construed as a disqualification, then it constitutes an unlawful discrimination in violation of the State and Federal Constitution. From this judgment the Commission appealed. The right to appeal is given by G. S. 96-15.

In their appeal to the Superior Court from the Commission, the claimants, by exceptions, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact. The trial court did not pass on these exceptions. It seems from the wording of the judgment the court did not attempt to set aside any of the findings. However, to eliminate any uncertainty in this respect, we have reviewed all the evidence and conclude that it furnishes support for the Commission's findings of fact. Findings, supported by competent evidence,

are conclusive on appeal. Employment Security Comm. v. Freight Lines, 248 N. C. 496, 103 SE 2d 829; In Re Stutts, 245 N. C. 405, 95 SE 2d 919; Employment Security Commission v. Simpson, 238 N. C. 296, 77 SE 2d 718; G. S. 96-15(i). The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the claimants are disqualified by the 1961 amendment to G. S. 96-14.

In the judicial process of construing legislation the courts take a long look at the purposes to be accomplished. The Congress, using the English Act of 1911 as a pattern, passed the Federal Social Security Act on August 14, 1935. One of its major purposes was to give aid, to be administered through State agencies, to those out of work through no fault of their own. To be eligible for Federal contributions, a State agency was required to levy an unemployment compensation tax on employers to supplement the Federal contribution. In its extra session in 1936 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted its Unemployment Compensation Law to take advantage of the Federal grant. One of its major purposes was to provide a fund by systematic accumulations during periods of employment to be retained and used for the benefit of persons furloughed from their jobs through no fault of their own.

Both the State and Federal Acts were passed at a time when the country appeared to be in the initial stages of recovery from a disastrous depression. The lessons learned in the early thirties were both fresh and poignant. The intent was to accumulate, by Federal grant and by an employer's tax, an insurance fund which in a time of need would tide over workers temporarily laid off because work was not available. Employers in all probability did not contemplate their tax money would be used to encourage any work stoppage resulting from a labor dispute. In discussing this background, the Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, of June, 1958, contained the following:

"(1) It was not considered wise to permit the fund to be used to finance or subsidize workers engaged in trade dis-

putes, because it was feared that if benefits were available to all workers unemployed as a result of a trade dispute, they would be encouraged to suspend work in furtherance of their position in the dispute, thereby imposing an unfair burden upon the employer, and working injury upon the national economy and upon the public at large; (2) because there had been no previous experience, it was feared that payment of benefits when unemployment was due to a labor dispute might cause a severe drain upon the funds available, thereby defeating the primary purpose for which the fund was created — the payment of benefits when unemployment was due to 'fluctuations in trade.'"

It is doubtful whether in 1935-36 legislators — Federal or State — had in contemplation a time when a few specialists out on strike could force a shutdown of a flourishing business employing nearly 18,000 persons in 26 States, the District of Columbia, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. Neither was it contemplated that the insurance fund could be depleted by workers who were not actually participating in the strike but who were out of work because of it. The depletion of the insurance fund required further employer taxes.

As the years passed the original objects lost some of their clear outlines. Rules and regulations were relaxed permitting depletion of the fund for purposes not in contemplation when provision was made for it. However, in North Carolina the amendment of 1961 reversed the trend. Prior to July 1, 1961, G. S. 96-14 provided:

"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . (4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commission that — (a) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage

of work; and (b) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute: Provided, for the purpose of this subdivision (4), that if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate business in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises."

Effective July 1, 1961, the General Assembly, by Chapter 454, Session Laws of 1961, struck out all of Section 4 above quoted and substituted the following:

"(4) For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same employing unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at which he is or was last employed: Provided, that an individual disqualified under the provisions of this subdivision shall continue to be disqualified thereunder after the labor dispute has ceased to be in active progress for such period of time as is reasonably necessary and required to physically resume operations in the method of operating in use at the plant, factory, or establishment of the employing unit."

The effect of the amendment was to eliminate from Section 4 the means therein provided by which an employee might escape disqualification. Likewise, the amendment removed the provision that separate branches of work commonly con-

ducted in separate premises or in separate departments of the same premises shall be deemed to be separate factories, establishments, or other premises. Instead the amendment extended the disqualification if the unemployment is caused by labor dispute in progress at the factory at which the worker was employed or at another place, either within or without this State, if owned or operated by the same employing unit and which supplies materials or services necessary to continue the operation where he was employed.

In this case planes carrying practically two-thirds of Eastern Air Lines' transportation business were grounded because flight engineers refused to operate or to service the planes. Only two-motor craft could operate without the flight engineers. These small planes were engaged in feeder operations on short flights. The heart of Eastern's business was the four-motor and jet planes. As a result of the labor dispute between Eastern and its flight engineers, Eastern was forced to shut down its operations and to close its terminals in North Carolina where claimants had been at work. So far as the results are concerned, it was immaterial where the flight engineers lived, or where their flights originated. When they left the planes, transportation stopped. Eastern's employees at the terminals in North Carolina were furloughed because Eastern was forced out of business by the strike.

Without force is the argument that flight engineers were not based in North Carolina and hence the terminals in this State constituted other plants, factories, establishments, and premises of the employing unit. It must be remembered that new Section 4, in effect at the time the work stopped, extends the disqualification to workers at a factory, establishment, or other premise which supplies necessary materials or services to the plant where the claimants were last employed. The striking flight engineers refused to help man the planes to or from the terminals in North Carolina. This failure to perform this service caused the shutdown at the terminals where claimants were employed.

The many cases cited by the Air Line Pilots Association

are not in point. Their brief states: "Since no statute has been found in any jurisdiction written in the discriminatory language of G. S. 96-14 (4), as amended, all cases reviewed reveal situations arising under Unemployment Security Acts which are similar to the North Carolina Unemployment Security Act prior to 1961." The Commission was bound by the disqualifying terms of the 1961 amendment. Its duty was to protect the integrity of the insurance fund and to be neutral between the management and the workers.

The disqualification resulted from the labor dispute between the flight engineers and Eastern. All flight engineers in the system were out on strike. Their duties were so integrated into Eastern's entire operation that the big planes were grounded because of their refusal to work. Cameron v. DeBoard, 230 Or. 411, 370 P. 2d 709; Depaoli v. Ernst, 73 Nev. 79, 309 P. 2d 363; Adamski v. State, Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 108 Ohio App. 198, 161 NE 2d 907; Spielmann v. Industrial Commission, 236 Wis. 240, 295 NW 1; Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 SE 209; Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan Employ. Sec. Com'n., 355 Mich. 103, 94 NW 2d 407; Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 NW 2d 689.

The cases here discussed, and many more therein cited, would seem sufficient to convince all but the highly skeptical that in passing the 1961 amendment the North Carolina General Assembly acted within its constitutional powers. "When the subject lies within the police power of the State, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set aside because compliance is burdensome." Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581, 76 L. ed. 1167; In re Stevenson, 237 N. C. 528, 75 SE 2d 520; Employment Security Com. v. Jarrell, 231 N. C. 381, 57 SE 2d 403; In re Steelman, 219 N. C. 306, 13 SE 2d 544. "Legislative bodies may distinguish, select, and classify objects of legislation. . . . They may prescribe different regulations for different classes. . . .

The one requirement is that the ordinance must affect all persons similarly situated or engaged in the same business without discrimination." State v. Trantham, 230 N. C. 641, 55 SE 2d 198; see also, Bickett v. Tax Commission, 177 N. C. 433, 99 SE 415; Magoin v. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. ed. 1037; City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 SW 2d 1; Unemployment Compensation Com. v. Willis, 219 N. C. 709, 15 SE 2d 4; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279. The unemployment insurance acts of the states contain certain worker disqualifications, among them, (1) discharge for misconduct, (2) refusal to accept other suitable employment, (3) participation in a strike. The power of the legislature to provide these disqualifications is not challenged. The further disqualification contained in the 1961 amendment involves a question of degree and not of principle.

For the reasons here stated, we hold the judgment of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County was erroneous and must be

Reversed.

Rodman, J., took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

JUDGMEN

SUPREME COURT OF NO

IN THE MATTER OF:
J. K. ABERNATHY, SS No. 244-42-7854, Employee,
et al _____
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Employer
and
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH
CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina _____

This cause came on to be argued upon the transcript of the

_____County: Upon consideration whereof, this Court is of opini
proceedings of said Superior Court.

It is therefore considered and adjudged by the Court here

*Honorable_____*Carlisle W. Higgins*_____Justice, be certifi*

_____ JUDGMENT IS RE

_____

*And it is considered and adjudged further, that the_____*Empl
costs of the appeal in this Court incurred, to wit, the sum of _
and execution issue therefor. Certified to Superior Court this_____

A TRUE COPY

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By s

IT
ORTH CAROLINA

SPRING TERM, 19 63

No. 233 Mecklenburg County.

record from the Superior Court Mecklenburg
on that there is --- error in the record and
that the opinion of the Court, as delivered by the
ed to the said Superior Court, to the intent that the
VERSED

oyment Security Commission do pay the
Seven and no/100 dollars ($ 7.00),
22nd day of April 196 3.

n J. Newton
Clerk of the Supreme Court.
Sarah B. Hanner
Sarah B. Hanner, Deputy

DECLARATION OF STATE PUBLIC POLICY
G. S. 96-2

"Declaration of State Public Policy — As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which required appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CERTIFICATION OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY PURSUANT TO SECTION 3303(b)(1) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954

The unemployment compensation laws of the States listed below, having been certified pursuant to paragraph (3) of section 3303(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3303(b)(3)) and each of the States so listed having been certified by me to the Secretary of the Treasury for the taxable year 1961 as provided in section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3304), are hereby certified, pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 3303(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3303(b)(1)), to the Secretary of the Treasury for the taxable year 1961.

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

December 31, 1961

s/W. Willard Wirtz
Acting Secretary of Labor

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CERTIFICATION OF STATES TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY PURSUANT TO SECTION 3304 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954

Pursuant to section 3304(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3304(a)) the unemployment compensation laws of the following States have heretofore been approved:

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

In accordance with the provisions of section 3304(c the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3304(c) hereby certify the foregoing states to the Secretary of Treasury for the taxable year 1961.

December 31, 1961

s/W. Willard Wirtz
Acting Secretary of Labor

GEN. FORM NO. 126
(NOVEMBER 1961)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Washington

RECORDS AUTHENTICATION CERTIFICATE

I **HEREBY ATTEST**, That the annexed copy, or each of the specified number of copies, of each document listed below is a true copy of a document in the official custody of the Department of Labor.

2 copies—Certification of State Unemployment Compensation Laws to the Secretary of the Treasury Pursuant to Section 3303(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 signed by W. Willard Wirtz, Acting Secretary of Labor, December 31, 1961

2 copies—Certification of States to the Secretary of the Treasury Pursuant to Section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 signed by W. Willard Wirtz, Acting Secretary of Labor, December 31, 1961

SIGNATURE AND OFFICIAL TITLE	DIVISION AND BUREAU	DATE
s/ William U. Norwood, Jr. *William U. Norwood, Jr.,* *Acting Administrator*	*Bureau of Employment Security*	*September 3, 1963*

I **HEREBY CERTIFY**, That *William U. Norwood, Jr.* who signed the foregoing attestation, is now and was at the time of signing (title) *Acting Administrator* and has legal custody of the official records of the United States Department of Labor therein attested and that full faith and credit should be given to his act as such.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I *Don C. Sowers* duly designated by the Secretary of Labor as Authentication Officer of the Department of Labor have hereunto subscribed my name and caused the seal of the Department of Labor to be affixed this *3rd* day of *September, 1963*.

Don C. Sowers
Authentication Officer
United States Department of Labor